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A CURE FOR A “PUBLIC CONCERN”: WASHINGTON’S 
NEW ANTI-SLAPP LAW 
Tom Wyrwich 
Abstract: In March 2010, the Washington State Legislature passed its Act Limiting 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. The new Act fills a critical void in 
Washington’s protection of free expression and petition rights. The Washington Act protects 
the free expression of Washington citizens by shielding them from meritless lawsuits 
designed only to incur costs and chill future expression. This Comment offers interpretive 
guidance for Washington courts by examining the new law, its legislative history, its 
constitutional underpinnings, and its relationship to the influential California anti-SLAPP 
statute on which it is modeled. Although the Washington Act shares many identical 
provisions with the California statute, Washington’s Act does include important deviations 
from the California model. This Comment embraces long-standing canons of statutory 
construction to argue that the Washington Act’s deviations reveal a specific intent to reject 
certain aspects of the California law. Among these specific rejections is the California law’s 
broader coverage of protected free expression. While California protects expression related to 
“issues of public interest,” the Washington Act protects expression related only to “issues of 
public concern.” Washington courts interpreting this important provision should reject 
California case law and embrace the “public concern” test established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers, a test that already occupies solid ground in Washington 
case law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to speak on issues of public concern lies at the heart of the 
freedom of speech.1 That freedom, guaranteed by both the federal and 
Washington State constitutions,2 protects the right to criticize the 
military draft,3 provides a shield for newspapers to publish classified 
documents,4 and shelters from liability groups who choose to stage 
peaceful boycotts.5 Despite these important protections of free 
                                                     
1. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).  
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”). 
3. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding that a vulgar phrase worn on a 
jacket is protected speech).  
4. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (rejecting prior restraint of 
publication of Pentagon Papers).  
5. See NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 889, 934 (1982) (reversing award of damages for 
boycott of white merchants after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.).  
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expression rights, the state and federal constitutions fail to protect 
citizens from the exorbitant legal expense necessary to defend these 
rights in court. It is this failure that the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation (SLAPP) exploits. 
Plaintiffs file SLAPPs to interfere with the protected free expression 
of defendants.6 A SLAPP has little or no chance of success in the 
courts.7 Even without a successful court judgment, though, a SLAPP 
accomplishes an ulterior goal: forcing defendants who legally exercised 
their constitutional rights of free expression into costly litigation that 
chills their current and future involvement in public debate.8 Until July 
2010, Washington provided few options to dismiss these frivolous 
lawsuits.9 
With the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (“the Act” or “the Washington Act”),10 Washington joined 
a growing group of states—including, most notably, California—that 
have extended anti-SLAPP protection to defend public exercises of free 
expression.11 These laws allow individuals and companies, particularly 
media organizations, to not only dismiss lawsuits intended to frustrate 
their free expression rights, but also to secure attorney’s fees and 
additional relief.12 
Although the Washington Act is similar to California’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, it is no mirror image.13 The Act’s legislative history, the 
Washington State Constitution’s protection of free expression, and a 
                                                     
6. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on its 
Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (2000) (SLAPPs “have the effect 
of interfering with the defendants past or future exercise of constitutionally protected rights”). 
7. See infra Part I.A.  
8. See Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924 (“‘SLAPPs[] are typically dismissed as groundless or unconstitutional, but often not 
before the defendants are put to great expense, harassment, and interruption of their productive 
activities.”). 
9. The Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation became law in 
July 2010. See Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 921. 
10. Id.  
11. E.g., Citizen Participation in Government Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 16-63-508 
(2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006); 
Citizen Participation Act, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1 to 110/99 (West Supp. 2011); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 
(2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (Supp. 2010).  
12. See infra Part IV.C.  
13. See infra Part IV.  
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comparison of statutory texts of the Washington and California laws all 
demonstrate that Washington courts should not interpret the two statutes 
in lockstep.14 This Comment analyzes these sources and implores 
Washington courts to pay special attention to provisions of the 
California statute that the Washington State Legislature expressly 
adopted, modified, or ignored.15 
Part I of this Comment introduces the necessity of anti-SLAPP laws 
to protect those who engage in acts of constitutional free expression. Part 
II explains the evolution of the Washington State Legislature’s anti-
SLAPP statutory scheme, from its groundbreaking “Brenda Hill Bill” in 
1989 to the passage of the new act in 2010. Part III explores the many 
similarities between California’s influential anti-SLAPP statute and the 
Washington Act. Part IV shows that, despite their many similarities, the 
Washington Act includes important deviations from the California 
model. Finally, Part V argues that long-standing canons of statutory 
interpretation demonstrate that the Washington State Legislature, in 
borrowing many provisions of the California statute, implicitly intended 
to adopt those provisions and their corresponding case law. Likewise, by 
modifying or ignoring certain California provisions, the Washington 
State Legislature specifically intended to reject those provisions and 
their judicial interpretations. In particular, the Washington State 
Legislature rejected language from the California law defining the scope 
of protected activities. While the California law protects speech related 
to “issues of public interest,” the Washington Act protects only “issues 
of public concern.” This explicit modification demonstrates the 
Washington State Legislature’s intent to apply the “public concern” test 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Connick v. Myers,16 a test 
that already occupies solid ground in Washington jurisprudence. 
I. SLAPPS FRUSTRATE THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND 
PETITION ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC CONCERN 
The right to comment on issues of public concern occupies a central 
position in First Amendment law.17 The right to participate in debate on 
public issues derives not only from the Free Speech Clause, but also the 
Petition Clause.18 The Petition Clause has been extended to cover 
                                                     
14. See infra Part V.  
15. See infra Part V.  
16. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
17. Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 US 357, 377 (1997).  
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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petitions and “any peaceful, legal attempt” to influence government 
action through any body—even the electorate.19 It is those fundamental 
individual rights that a SLAPP aims to frustrate. 
A. SLAPPs Frustrate Public Participation by Creating Costly 
Litigation for Defendants Speaking on Issues of Public Concern 
The necessity for anti-SLAPP laws arises not out of the inability of 
state and federal constitutions to protect free expression, but rather the 
inefficiency with which the American judicial system provides that 
constitutional protection. In a SLAPP, the plaintiff bases the lawsuit on 
the defendant’s free expression activities.20 But unlike many reasonable 
challenges to free speech, claims in a SLAPP lack merit.21 With no 
concern for the inevitable failure of the lawsuit, a SLAPP forces 
defendants—who have lawfully exercised their constitutional right of 
expression or petition—into costly litigation that may chill the 
defendant’s future participation in the public debate.22 
After studying more than 240 cases, University of Denver Professors 
George W. Pring and Penelope Canan coined the term “Strategic 
Lawsuit Against Public Participation.”23 In each of the cases they 
studied, the claim involved communications filed against 
nongovernment individuals or organizations on an issue of public 
interest or social significance.24 The cases involved not only lawsuits 
traditionally associated with free speech, such as libel and defamation 
suits, but other actions such as business interference, conspiracy, or 
trespass.25 
Because of the cost that it entails, the threat of lengthy litigation 
becomes vital to a SLAPP’s effectiveness.26 Plaintiffs rarely win in court 
but often realize their ultimate goal: to devastate the defendant 
                                                     
19. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 3, 211 
(1996). 
20. Tate, supra note 6, at 802–03. 
21. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for 
Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 423–24 (1991). Both the 
Washington and California anti-SLAPP statutes provide avenues for plaintiffs to prove their claim 
has merit, even if it is directed at punishing or frustrating public participation. Compare WASH. 
REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3) (West Supp. 2011). 
22. See Metabolife Int’l, Inc., v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001).  
23. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at vi.  
24. Id. at 8–9. 
25. Id. at 150–51.  
26. See Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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financially and chill the defendant’s public involvement.27 Although 
there are actions that a SLAPP defendant can take either during or after 
litigation—a so-called SLAPPback28—courts have found that those 
measures will likely do little to deter the plaintiff.29 The traditional 
safeguards against meritless actions tend to have little effect because a 
SLAPP filer may consider any sanction “as merely a cost of doing 
business.”30 
B. The Case of Camer v. Seattle Post-Ingelligencer Demonstrates a 
SLAPP’s Costly Impact 
The case of Susan Goldberg demonstrates the damage a SLAPP can 
inflict without anti-SLAPP legislation. In 1982, Goldberg worked as a 
reporter for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.31 On June 20, 1982, the 
newspaper published her story, ‘Nuisance’ Suits Clog the Courts.32 The 
story addressed what several Seattle attorneys viewed as an issue of 
local concern: the effects and implications of pro se litigants filing 
frivolous claims in county courts.33 The published article stated that, 
“correctly or not,” area attorneys had leveled accusations that Dorothy 
Camer and Margaret Coughlin had filed nuisance suits. 34 Both Camer 
and Coughlin declined opportunities to speak with Goldberg for the 
story.35 But on July 20, 1982, Camer and Coughlin alleged that the 
article defamed them in their joint complaint for libel.36 
The trial court and appellate court both held that the plaintiffs, as a 
matter of law, did not present a valid claim for trial.37 Goldberg’s article 
was “undoubtedly opinion and therefore not actionable.”38 But the trial 
court did not dispose of the plaintiffs’ case until almost two years after 
                                                     
27. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 29 (“Filers seldom win a legal victory—the normal 
litigation goal—yet often achieve their goals in the real world.”). 
28. Id. at 11, 123–24 (discussing how defendants can use a countersuit for malicious 
prosecution).  
29. See Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 500.  
30. Id.  
31. See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash. App. 29, 31, 723 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1986). 
32. Susan Goldberg, ‘Nuisance’ Suits Clog the Courts, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 20, 
1982, at A4.  
33. Camer, 45 Wash. App. at 31–32, 723 P.2d at 1197–98.  
34. Goldberg, supra note 32, at A4. 
35. Camer, 45 Wash. App. at 35, 723 P.2d at 1199.  
36. Id. at 32, 723 P.2d at 1198.  
37. Id. at 44, 723 P.2d at 1204. 
38. Id. at 41, 723 P.2d at 1202. 
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the plaintiffs filed their complaint.39 The Washington Court of Appeals 
did not announce its opinion until August 20, 1986—four years after the 
original filing.40 Even though both courts considered the libel claim to be 
meritless, the plaintiffs forced the Seattle Post-Intelligencer into court 
for four years.41 Considering that defending a typical libel lawsuit costs 
at least $20,000 to $50,000 merely to get through the initial rounds of 
dismissal,42 the Seattle Post-Intelligencer’s victory was likely a costly 
one. 
The lawsuit against the Seattle Post-Intelligencer imposed more than 
only financial costs. For four years, the Camer litigation forced 
Goldberg and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer to defend their professional 
reputations against charges of defamation and libel. The SLAPP 
transformed a public debate—a discussion regarding the propriety of 
“nuisance suits,” including those claims filed by the Camer plaintiffs—
into a private dispute in the state courts. Often, this role transformation, 
in which the party legally acting within its rights must defend itself, 
discourages future exercise of free expression rights.43 When Professors 
Pring and Canan completed their study, they estimated that SLAPPs 
likely resulted in thousands of citizens being “sued into silence.”44 
Without laws to protect those engaged in public participation, SLAPP 
filers can freely use litigation to discourage their opposition. 
II. WASHINGTON’S PROTECTION OF PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION HAS SLOWLY EVOLVED FROM THE 
NATION’S FIRST ANTI-SLAPP LAW 
Recognizing the dangerous effect of SLAPP lawsuits on free 
expression, Washington became the first state to pass an anti-SLAPP 
law with its “Brenda Hill Bill” in 1989. The landmark law protected 
defendants against frivolous lawsuits challenging the defendants’ lawful 
communication with government agencies. Thirteen years later, the 
                                                     
39. Id. at 32–33, 723 P.2d at 1198. The complaint was dismissed on May 7, 1984. Id. at 33, 723 
P.2d at 1198.  
40. Id. at 29, 723 P.2d at 1195.  
41. The appellate court did not consider awarding attorney’s fees to the Post-Intelligencer. See id. 
42. Rachel Smolkin, Cities Without Newspapers?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2009, at 16, 
25. The Post-Intelligencer shut down its print publication on March 17, 2009, after losing $14 
million the previous year. Dan Richman & Andrea James, Seattle P-I to Publish Last Edition 
Tuesday, SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 16, 2009, 10:00 PM), www.seattlepi.com/business/403793_piclosur
e17.html. 
43. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 29.  
44. Id. at 3. 
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Washington State Legislature recognized a need to enhance this limited 
protection. In a 2002 amendment, the legislature strengthened the 
penalties for filing a SLAPP and also provided courts better guidance for 
early SLAPP dismissal. 
A. With the “Brenda Hill Bill,” the Nation’s First Anti-SLAPP Law, 
Washington Protected Citizens’ Communication with Government 
Bodies 
Washington passed its first anti-SLAPP legislation in 1989.45 The 
legislature enacted the bill in response to the efforts of a young 
Washington mother named Brenda Hill. After discovering that her real 
estate company owed the state hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
unpaid taxes, Hill reported the company to the state government.46 In 
retaliation for this lawful act, the real estate company sued and harassed 
Hill to the point of bankruptcy.47 After Hill picketed the capitol steps and 
received favorable media attention, the Washington State Legislature 
introduced a bill to provide relief to victims of similarly vindictive 
lawsuits.48 The law, known as the “Brenda Hill Bill,”49 provided 
immunity from civil liability for claims based on good-faith 
communication with the government regarding any matter “reasonably 
of concern.”50 The law was America’s first modern anti-SLAPP law.51 
The Brenda Hill Bill was not without defects. Notably, it provided no 
method for early dismissal.52 With courts unable to dismiss SLAPPs 
before discovery, defendants had no means of escaping the significant 
legal expenses SLAPPs intend to inflict.53 Additionally, the requirement 
                                                     
45. Act of May 5, 1989, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1119. 
46. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 130.  
47. Id. at 130–31. The real estate company, in retaliation, filed for foreclosure on Hill’s home, 
filed a $1,000,000 defamation claim, and put a gag order on the Hills. Id. The president of the 
company went so far so say “we’re going to get every last nickel she has.” Id. at 131 (quoting 
Walter Hatch, Dream Home Is Couple’s Nightmare, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1988, at D1). For 
years, Brenda Hill felt as if the government had abandoned her in her fight. She received little 
support in defending the company’s lawsuits. The Hills’ homeowners insurance was canceled; they 
had to file for bankruptcy to protect their home. Id. at 130. 
48. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 132.  
49. Id. at 192.  
50. Act of May 5, 1989, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1119–20. 
51. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 191. 
52. See Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory 
Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation,” 38 GONZ. L. REV. 263, 
284–85 (2003). 
53. See id. at 284.  
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of “good faith” only increased the need for a factual inquiry.54 The need 
to resolve factual issues often dragged defendants through litigation for 
years, muting the law’s intended effects.55 
B. In a 2002 Amendment, Washington Expanded Protection to the 
Right of Petition, but Not All Exercises of the Right of Expression 
In 2002, the Washington State Legislature amended the law to help 
cure several of the Brenda Hill Bill’s defects.56 The legislature removed 
the “good faith” requirement as an element of a SLAPP defense, 
effectively granting immunity to all protected activity, regardless of the 
defendant’s intent.57 The amendment also authorized courts to award 
statutory damages of $10,000 to the defendants, although courts could 
deny that award if they found the defendants acted in bad faith.58 The 
legislature also instructed the courts that it intended the law to provide 
“clear rules for early dismissal review.”59 
Like the Brenda Hill Bill before it, however, the 2002 amendment 
was not without defects. The amendment limited itself to communication 
with the government and self-regulatory organizations.60 For example, 
the amendment would not apply to a newspaper article.61 Like the 
Brenda Hill Bill before it, the amended statute applied only to dismiss  
“a civil action for damages,” and not to claims for injunctive relief, such 
as a temporary restraining order.62 And although the availability of a 
$10,000 award of damages might deter SLAPPs in some situations,  it 
hurt SLAPP defendants in others; the burden of fighting a challenge that 
                                                     
54. See id.  
55. Id. at 284–85. 
56. Act of March 28, 2002, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057. 
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010); Johnston, supra note 52, at 285–86. 
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510. 
59. 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057. 
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.  
61. The statute does not include the electorate as a branch of the government, so communication 
with the electorate in a newspaper article, similar to the subject of the Camer litigation, would not 
receive protection. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.  
62. Emmerson v. Weilep, 126 Wash. App. 930, 936–37, 110 P.3d 214, 216–17 (2005) (quoting 
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500). In Emmerson, a Spokane city code enforcement officer received a 
restraining order from a resident who made several complaints regarding a neighbor’s land use, and 
then made complaints to the Spokane City council, City administrator, and police department 
regarding the officer’s investigation. Emmerson, 126 Wash. App. at 933–34, 110 P.3d at 215–16. 
Without specifically addressing whether the defendant’s activity was protected, the court held that 
the anti-SLAPP motion did not apply because the officer had not made a claim for damages. Id. at 
937, 110 P.3d at 217.  
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the defendant acted in bad faith had the potential to lengthen litigation to 
the point of reducing the SLAPP defense’s efficiency.63 These defects 
continued to plague Washington SLAPP defendants until the legislature 
authored its new California-style anti-SLAPP law in 2010. 
III. THE 2010 WASHINGTON ANTI-SLAPP ACT CLOSELY 
MIRRORS CALIFORNIA’S, AND COURTS HAVE 
INTERPRETED THEM SIMILARLY 
Even as Washington amended its state law in 2002 to provide more 
protection for those petitioning the government, other state legislatures 
had already enacted anti-SLAPP laws that went further. In 1992, after 
two previous attempts to pass an anti-SLAPP law,64 California passed a 
law that went well beyond petitioning. The law, a procedural motion to 
strike a claim, protects exercises of the right to petition and the right of 
free speech “in connection with a public issue.”65 The California law 
allows plaintiffs to proceed past the motion to strike if they can prove “a 
probability” that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.66 Several states 
soon followed suit: by 2010, ten states had followed California’s lead in 
protecting both the exercise of the right of free speech and the right to 
petition.67 Washington joined those states when it passed the Act in 
2010.68 
Governor Christine Gregoire signed the Washington Act Limiting 
Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation into law on March 18, 
2010, just two months after it first appeared before the State Senate 
Judiciary Committee.69 The Act went into effect June 10, 2010.70 The 
bill did not have a particularly long or dramatic history. Between the 
original bill that first appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee71 
                                                     
63. Johnston, supra note 52, at 288.  
64. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 196. 
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
66. Id.  
67. See statutes cited supra note 11.   
68. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924. 
69. See History of Bill, Senate Bill 6395, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=6395&year=2009 (last visited Aug. 2, 2011). 
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2011). 
71. See S.B. 6395, 61st Leg., 1st Sess. (Wash. 2010), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6395.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2011). State senators Adam Kline, Claudia Kauffman, and Jeanne Kohl-Welles sponsored 
the bill. Id. at 1. 
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and the final law,72 the bill underwent only one substantive change, 
which related to the relief for defeating a frivolously filed anti-SLAPP 
motion.73 Otherwise, the Act passed by unanimous consent with no floor 
debate in either the state house or senate.74 
The Washington Act bears a close resemblance to the California law, 
and courts have taken notice. An analysis of the texts reveals several 
similar provisions, starting with their instruction that courts interpret the 
statutes broadly and continuing with their parallel structure and common 
terms of art. Additionally, the two statutes protect the same essential 
constitutional right. With these similarities in mind, courts have begun 
using California law to interpret the Washington Act. 
A. The Two Statutes Include Many Similar Provisions 
The similarities between the California statute and the Washington 
Act begin with the two statutes’ common directive that courts construe 
them broadly. The similarities continue with the statutes’ parallel 
procedural structure, and their required stay of discovery. Finally, the 
two laws use identical terms to describe the protected activity. 
1. Both Statutes Instruct Courts to Construe Them Broadly 
The California State Legislature encourages broad construction of its 
anti-SLAPP statute. When it enacted the statute, the legislature found “a 
disturbing increase” in lawsuits initiated primarily to chill public 
participation,75 and it declared that SLAPPs represented an “abuse of the 
judicial process.”76 In a 1997 amendment to the statute,77 the California 
State Legislature added language requiring that the law be broadly 
construed.78 This sentence has had a tremendous effect on the statute’s 
                                                     
72. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 921. 
73. The original bill did not allow for plaintiffs to obtain relief exceeding $10,000 for a 
frivolously filed motion. At least one committee member worried that the law’s sword was not 
equally sharp on both edges, providing more protection to those who frivolously file anti-SLAPP 
motion than those who frivolously file SLAPPs. See Proposed Substitute to Senate Bill 6395, 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/CMD/showdoc.ashx?u=A2iGB9PMbwyP2X1C%2bw7qdVoo636n00r/Ah88
8keMqQ2FVbQNr8ngp%2btO06aTJMdgMg53kw5bRK5IsDdB/3g6WwwhGtPDHT/P&y=2010 
(last visited on Aug. 2, 2011). 
74. See History of Bill, Senate Bill 6395, supra note 69.  
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 2011). 
76. Id.  
77. Tate, supra note 6, at 816.  
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a). The legislature amended the law to include this statement 
in 1997 to react to what had been a narrow interpretation of the statute in its genesis. See Tate, supra 
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interpretation, particularly in determining those activities that the law 
protects.79 Courts use this provision to resolve difficult questions in 
favor of providing a broad right of recovery.80 
Similarly, the Washington Act requires that courts apply and construe 
the law liberally “to effectuate its general purpose of protecting 
participants in public controversies from an abusive use of the courts.”81 
The Washington Act expresses concern about lawsuits initiated 
primarily to chill the constitutional rights of free speech and petition, and 
also reasons that expedited judicial review will “avoid the potential for 
abuse in these cases.”82 
2. Both Statutes Provide a Procedural Remedy for SLAPP Defendants 
The procedural remedy that the California law provides has proven to 
be “a potent weapon for defendants.”83 The California statute applies to 
claims arising out of exercises of the right of petition and the right of 
free speech “in connection with a public issue.”84 The California statute 
focuses “not [on] the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, 
[on] the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted 
                                                     
note 6, at 823–24. Prior to the amendment, courts had narrowed the application only to activities 
“closely tied to the right to petition and the freedom of speech.” Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. 
Investors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Zhao v. 
Wong, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 909, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). One study found that in the first year-and-
a-half, twenty-two of forty-nine anti-SLAPP motions failed. PRING & CANAN, supra note 19, at 
198. 
79. Tate, supra note 6, at 826–27 (stating that the “spirit of the statute’s mandate of broad 
construction” affects courts’ approaches).  
80. See, e.g., Dowling v. Zimmerman, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating 
that the “purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute will be promoted by construing that statute broadly to 
permit a pro se SLAPP defendant” to recover fees); Lam v. Ngo, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 584–85 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that “[b]ecause the Legislature has specified that [§425.16] is to be 
construed broadly,” filing deadlines start fresh with amended complaint); Damon v. Ocean Hills 
Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Given the mandate that we 
broadly construe the anti-SLAPP statute, a single publication does not lose its ‘public forum’ 
character merely because it does not provide a balanced point of view.”); see also Jerome I. Braun, 
California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 740 (2003) 
(“This statement of legislative intent has permitted resolution of many knotty problems and has 
been explicitly relied on by a significant number of courts as a key to their decisions.”) 
81. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924. 
82. Id. at 921. 
83. 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 
16.2.2, at 16–6 (3d ed. 2009).  
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011).  
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liability.”85 Therefore, California courts first ask whether the claim is 
based on an activity of the defendant that constitutes protected speech or 
petitioning.86 The plaintiff’s claim must “arise from” the activity; merely 
because a claim has been filed at some time after the defendant engaged 
in such an act will not invoke anti-SLAPP protection.87 
Should a defendant filing an anti-SLAPP motion prove to the court 
that the claim arises out of protected activity, it has cleared only the first 
hurdle. Next, the plaintiff has the opportunity to establish, through the 
pleadings and affidavits,88 that there is a probability that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the claim.89 
The Washington Act follows the same structure to provide the 
identical procedural remedy.  The Washington Act applies “to any claim, 
however characterized, that is based on an action involving public 
participation and petition.”90 Should a Washington defendant prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the Washington Act applies, the 
burden then shifts to the SLAPP filer to establish, by clear and 
convincing evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim.91 If the 
SLAPP filer cannot meet that burden, then not only must the court strike 
the complaint, but the court must also award attorney’s fees, a $10,000 
damage award, and any additional relief to “deter repetition of the 
conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”92 If the 
SLAPP filer succeeds in demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the 
claim, that determination may not be admitted into evidence later in the 
case, and it has no effect on the burden of proof in the underlying 
claim.93 
3. Both Statutes Require the Court to Stay Discovery Unless the 
Plaintiff Can Demonstrate “Good Cause” 
California law addressed one of the primary weapons of SLAPPs—
                                                     
85. Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002).  
86. Id.  
87. See City of Cotati v. Cashman, 52 P.3d 695, 700 (Cal. 2002).  
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2) (West Supp. 2011). California courts require that the 
evidence submitted also be admissible at trial. See Salma v. Capon, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 873, 884 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008) (citing Evans v. Unkow, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).  
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).  
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011).  
91. § 4.24.525(4)(b).  
92. § 4.24.525(6)(a). 
93. § 4.24.525(4)(d).  
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the high costs of discovery before dismissal94—by including a statutory 
provision that stays discovery upon filing of an anti-SLAPP motion.95 
The stay goes into effect until the “notice of [an] entry of [an] order 
ruling on the motion,” and a plaintiff may only circumvent the stay by 
moving, with good cause, to conduct specified discovery.96 
The discovery stay allows a defendant served with a complaint arising 
from protected activity to “put the plaintiff to his or her proof before the 
plaintiff can conduct discovery.”97 Because the statute’s design promotes 
the “fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal of SLAPPs,”98 
California courts require plaintiffs to overcome a high burden to prove 
good cause.99 To satisfy the good cause standard, the plaintiff must make 
a timely showing that the defendant, or its agents and employees, knows 
or holds evidence that would defeat the defendant’s anti-SLAPP 
motion.100 Even if discovery is granted, parties must limit discovery to 
the issues raised in the anti-SLAPP motion101 and must go to an issue 
that the plaintiff should not be able to establish without discovery.102 For 
example, in a defamation case, it would not be enough for the plaintiff to 
request discovery to prove that a statement was false, or that the 
statement was published, because the plaintiff should be able to prove 
falsity or publication without discovery.103 
The Washington Act includes a similar discovery stay. It requires that 
a court stay all discovery as well as any pending hearings or motions 
until it has ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion.104 The only way to defeat 
this stay under the Washington Act is if the court orders further 
discovery “for good cause shown.”105 
                                                     
94. See supra Part II.  
95. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 2011). 
96. Id. 
97. Price v. Stossel, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Rogers v. Home 
Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 
98. Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
99. See Ludwig v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“The legislative 
intent is best served by an interpretation which would require a plaintiff to marshal facts sufficient 
to show the viability of the action before filing a SLAPP suit.” (emphasis in original)).  
100. See Price, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (citing Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g 
Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).  
101. Nguyen-Lam v. Cao, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Slauson P’ship 
v. Ochoa, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 680 (2003)).  
102. See, e.g., Paterno v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
103. Id.  
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011). 
105. § 4.24.525(5)(C). 
WLR_October_Wyrwich_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/2/2011  2:02 PM 
676 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:663 
 
The discovery stay is one of three important provisions in the 
Washington Act that deter the lengthy, costly litigation that often makes 
SLAPPs so devastating. Additionally, a court must hold a hearing on an 
anti-SLAPP motion no more than thirty days after service106 and it must 
announce its ruling within seven days of the hearing.107 Together, these 
provisions provide courts the ability to swiftly dismiss meritless claims 
with minimal cost to the defendant. Hence, the same complaint that took 
four years for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer to completely dispose of 
could potentially be dismissed, with no further discovery, in no more 
than thirty-seven days. 
4. Both Statutes Protect Statements Made in “Official Proceedings” 
Both the California anti-SLAPP statute and the Washington Act 
protect statements made in “official proceedings.”108 The question of 
whether an activity involves an official proceeding may often be a 
threshold question to determining whether California’s anti-SLAPP 
statute applies,109 so California courts must often draw difficult lines in 
deciding what constitutes an official proceeding authorized by law.110 
Although the statute plainly applies to court hearings111 and 
administrative proceedings,112 private proceedings held under the 
influence of the state present difficult cases for the courts.113 Often, the 
level of government entanglement involved in the event holds significant 
                                                     
106. § 4.24.525(5)(a). The provision does include a clause that allows for a later hearing if the 
“docket conditions of the court require [it].” Id. However, “such hearings should receive priority.” 
Id.  
107. § 4.24.525(5)(b). This provision provides no route for a court to escape this requirement. Id. 
108. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(2), with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2). 
109. In California, this may particularly be the case if the activity does not involve a public issue.  
110. See A.F. Brown Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that stop notice and other collection efforts did not constitute an 
official proceeding). But cf. Kibler v. N. Inyo Cnty. Local Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d 193, 199–200 (Cal. 
2006) (holding that peer medical review meeting was an official proceeding). Even if a court finds 
that a proceeding is an official proceeding, the defendant must still prove that his or her activity 
constituted a statement or writing related to the official proceeding. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
425.16(e)(2). 
111. See Rohde v. Wolf, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348, 353–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). An anti-SLAPP 
claim based on communications in court differs from the litigation privilege, which may still be 
relevant in establishing the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 17 
(Cal. 2006) (holding that litigation privilege and anti-SLAPP statute are “substantively different 
statutes that serve quite different purposes”); Rohde, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 356. 
112. See Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 2010).  
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116–121.  
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sway.114 
The California Supreme Court has analyzed several factors in 
determining if a proceeding is official under the statute: whether the 
proceeding is required under California law; whether results of a 
proceeding must be reported to a government authority; whether the 
proceeding plays a role in the public welfare; and whether the decisions 
made in a proceeding are subject to judicial review.115 Using those 
factors, the Court determined that the statute applied to a hospital peer 
review proceeding, which the state required the hospital to report and 
which allowed for judicial review.116 Other proceedings held to apply 
under the statute include statutorily mandated arbitration,117 and a public 
review hearing conducted by a government agency.118 Conversely, 
California courts have held that the following do not constitute an 
official proceeding: a “ministerial event” such as a sheriff’s auction,119 a 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding,120 and a collection effort made by a 
supplier against a contractor.121 
The Washington Act also protects statements made in official 
proceedings and in connection with issues before an official 
proceeding.122 The statutory language is similar to the California 
statute,123 but Washington courts have not yet had an opportunity to 
define what an official proceeding is in the context of the statute. 
5. Both Statutes Protect Statements Made in Public Forums 
The California anti-SLAPP statute protects statements made in a 
“public forum,” but the California courts do not define that term in 
lockstep with the First Amendment. In First Amendment law, a public 
                                                     
114. Compare Kibler, 138 P.3d at 200 (holding hospital peer medical review subject to 
administrative mandate and therefore is “quasi-judicial”), with Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
230, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding not an official 
proceeding because it was “not closely linked to any governmental . . . proceedings or regulation”). 
115. Kibler, 138 P.3d at 200 (interpreting the judicial review factor, “the Legislature has accorded 
a hospital’s peer review decisions a status comparable to that of quasi-judicial public agencies[]”). 
116. Id. at 199–200. 
117. See Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).  
118. Dixon v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 744 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  
119. See Blackburn v. Brady, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
120. See Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).  
121. A.F. Brown Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Elec. Supply, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006).  
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011). Additionally, the statute protects statements made 
in an effort to have a government body or official proceeding consider the issue. Id. 
123. Compare id., with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2011).   
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forum refers to either a place historically associated with open public 
debate—a street, sidewalk, or park—or a place designated for expressive 
activity.124 The California courts, though, have interpreted “public 
forum” more broadly in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.125 
To determine whether a public forum exists in the context of the 
statute, California courts ask whether the forum is a place126 where 
information is freely exchanged.127 By broadly construing the term as the 
legislature directed, California courts have determined that websites,128 
newspapers,129 magazines,130 call-in radio talk shows,131 and a 
homeowners association’s board meeting and newsletter132 qualify as 
public forums for the purpose of the statute. 
Like the California statute, the Washington Act protects statements 
made in public forums.133 Washington courts have not yet had an 
opportunity to define a public forum in the context of the statute. 
                                                     
124. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also Zhao v. 
Wong, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“The term ‘public forum’ . . . refers typically 
to those places historically associated with First Amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks 
and parks.”). Before the legislature amended the California statute in 1997 to encourage a broad 
construction of the statute, the California courts interpreted the term “public forum” consistently 
with First Amendment case law. See Zhao, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.  
125. See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
126. Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  
127. See Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). This includes forms of communications that come at a cost, such as newspapers and 
magazines. See Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that these forms of communication are public). The court found that a broad reading 
“comports with the fundamental purpose underlying the anti-SLAPP statute, which seeks to protect 
against ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights’ and ‘abuse of 
the judicial process.’” Id. at 217 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a)). 
128. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006) (“Web sites accessible to the 
public . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.”); Kronemyer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 48, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (Internet Movie Database, which provides information concerning 
film and television to 35 million visitors monthly, is a public forum); Vogel v. Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 350, 353, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (defendant’s Web site listing plaintiffs as Nos. 1 and 2 on list 
of “Top Ten Dumb Asses” is a public forum).  
129. See Nygård, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218.  
130. See id.  
131. See Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 941 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005).  
132. See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(d) (2011). 
WLR_October_Wyrwich_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/2/2011  2:02 PM 
2011] WASHINGTON’S ANTI-SLAPP LAW 679 
 
B. Washington’s Broad Constitutional Right to Free Speech, the Right 
the Washington Act Protects, Originates from the California State 
Constitution 
Both the Washington Act and the California anti-SLAPP statute 
protect against lawsuits targeted at lawful exercises of the right of 
petition and the right of free speech on issues of public concern. Those 
rights derive not only from the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution but also from the respective state constitutions. 
The free speech provision of the Washington State Constitution, like 
the Washington Act itself, is derived from the California State 
Constitution.134 The drafters of the Washington State Constitution 
surveyed the free speech laws of many states and elected to provide an 
affirmative right to free speech, rather than the state-action limitation 
seen in both the U.S. Constitution and the Oregon State Constitution.135 
When the drafters formalized the Washington State Constitution, they 
included a guarantee of free speech that mostly mirrored the California 
provision.136 
Washington State’s constitutional guarantee of free speech is broader 
than its federal counterpart. Whereas the U.S. Constitution, as a general 
rule, only forbids state action to abridge free speech,137 the Washington 
State Constitution includes no such explicit requirement: “[e]very person 
may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right.”138 Washington courts consider this right to be 
                                                     
134. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 19 (2002). 
135. Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional 
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 172–73, 177 (1985). 
136. See id. at 177. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1879, amended 1980), with WASH. CONST. 
art. I, § 5. The Washington drafters made one change from the California constitution, although the 
drafters likely did not see the change as affecting the right provided. Utter, supra note 135, at 177 
n.94. Washington elected not to include California’s additional clause that “no law shall be passed 
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the press.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1879, amended 
1980). It is likely that the Washington drafters thought that the clause was redundant; the 
affirmative right necessarily includes the prohibition against state limitation of the right. Utter, 
supra note 135, at 177 n.94. 
137. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976) (restricting the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment’s safeguards to state action). But see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1946) 
(holding that a privately-owned city that opens up its roads to the public is subject to First 
Amendment restrictions).  
138. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. See also David M. Skover, The Washington Constitutional “State 
Action” Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 282 
(1985)  (“Since the ‘state action’ doctrine fulfills no instrumental or normative function appropriate 
to state constitutional law decision-making, its abandonment is dictated by reason.”). 
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more expansive than the right granted by the U.S. Constitution.139 The 
state constitution’s right of petition does not qualitatively differ from the 
right the U.S. Constitution protects.140  Under both, no government actor 
may abridge the right to petition the government.141 
C.  Federal Courts Have Relied on California Case Law in Early 
Interpretations of the Washington Act 
Because the Washington Act only went into effect in June 2010, 
defendants have filed few anti-SLAPP motions under the Washington 
Act. Federal district courts in Washington, rather than Washington state 
courts, have been the first to issue opinions interpreting the Washington 
Act.142 These early decisions have revealed a heavy reliance on 
California statutory and case law.143 
In Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc.,144 Washington resident Ken 
Aronson sued controversial documentarian Michael Moore145 for using 
Aronson’s likeness, voice, and song from video footage Aronson shot in 
England in Moore’s health care documentary Sicko.146 Moore responded 
                                                     
139. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243–44, 635 P.2d 108, 
115–16 (1981).  
140. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4. See also Richmond v. 
Thompson, 901 P.2d 371, 376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state provision is usually 
interpreted “in harmony” with the First Amendment).  
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4.  
142. See Arata v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1551(RSL), 2011 WL 248200 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 
2011); Castello v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 
2010); Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Nguyen v. 
Clark Cnty., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
143. Only one court that has made an anti-SLAPP decision since the Washington Act became law 
has recognized the differences between the California and Washington statutes.  See N.Y. Studio, 
Inc., v. Better Bus. Bureau of Ala., Or., and W. Wash., No. 3:11-cv-05012(RBL), 2011 WL 
2414452, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2011) (discussing Washington’s stronger burden of proof to 
survive an anti-SLAPP motion).  
144. 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
145. Moore is well-known for the gun-control documentary Bowling for Columbine and the Iraq 
War documentary Fahrenheit 9/11, among others.  
146. SICKO (Dog Eat Dog Films 2007). The film claims to portray “the crazy and sometimes 
cruel U.S. health care system, told from the vantage of everyday people faced with extraordinary 
and bizarre challenges in their quest for basic health coverage.” Michael Moore, Film: Sicko, 
MICHAELMOORE.COM, http://www.michaelmoore.com/books-films/sicko (last visited Aug. 5, 
2011). The film features Eric Turnbow, a friend of Aronson’s, who injured his shoulder as he 
attempted to cross Abbey Road walking on his hands and received care in an English hospital. 
Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike at 3, Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (2010) 
(No. 3:10CV-05293-KLS), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washingt
on/wawdce/3:2010cv05293/167337/15/.  
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by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Aronson’s lawsuit.147 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
looked to California case law, after it reasoned that the Washington Act 
“mirrors” the California provision.148 The court held that Sicko 
undisputedly addressed an issue of public concern.149 The court noted, 
however, after analyzing other California cases, that even if an overall 
work addresses issues of public concern, it is possible for exercises of 
free speech within that work to fall outside of the statute’s protection.150 
Even though Moore “involuntarily thrust” Aronson into the health care 
discussion, Aronson’s appearance in the film “directly connected to the 
discussion of the healthcare system.”151 Therefore, Moore met his 
burden of proving that the statute applied to his activities.152 The court 
then examined Aronson’s claims to see if he had a probability of 
prevailing, and concluded that the claims were either barred by the First 
Amendment,153 preempted by the Copyright Act,154 or lacked merit.155 
The court awarded Moore attorney’s fees and the statutory award of 
$10,000.156 
In a second case before the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington, Castello v. City of Seattle,157 a Seattle paramedic 
filed a suit against several city firefighters and paramedics for 
defamation.158 The defendants had previously filed complaints with the 
city and spoken to a television station about the plaintiff’s harassing 
conduct.159 The court acknowledged Aronson’s reliance on California 
                                                     
147. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08.  
148. Id. at 1110. 
149. Id. at 1111. The court declined to interpret the Washington State Legislature’s intent in 
applying the Washington Act to issues “of public concern,” rather than to “public issue[s]” or 
“issue[s] of public interest.” See infra Part IV.A. 
150. Id. at 1112. The court relied on a California case in which a court found that even though the 
film Reality Bites addressed issues of public concern, the activity on which the lawsuit was based 
(the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in creating one of the film’s characters) did not. Dyer v. 
Childress, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
151. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. 
152. Id. at 1112. 
153. Id. at 1114. 
154. Id. at 1116. 
155. See id. at 1116–17.  
156. Id. at 1117.  
157. No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010). 
158. Id. at *1.  
159. Id. at *2. The news story was about low morale in the fire department. The defendants never 
mentioned the plaintiff by name in the story.  
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law and also used California case law as “persuasive authority” to 
determine whether the defendants successfully proved that the statute 
protected their activity.160 Using California case law as a guide,161 the 
court determined that the television broadcast constituted a public forum 
for the purposes of the Washington Act.162 
IV. DESPITE THEIR CLOSE RESEMBLANCE, THE 
WASHINGTON ACT AND THE CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTE HAVE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES 
The Washington State Legislature did not copy the California anti-
SLAPP statute verbatim when it drafted the Act. The Washington Act 
differs in several respects. Most significantly, the Washington Act chose 
not to adopt California’s protection of statements relating to an issue of 
“public interest,” and instead protected issues of “public concern,” a 
phrase with which Washington courts are already familiar. Additionally, 
the Washington Act does not include two exceptions in the California 
anti-SLAPP statute, and the Washington Act punishes SLAPP filers 
more severely than does the California statute. 
A. The Washington Act’s Protection of Statements Relating to an 
“Issue of Public Concern” Differs from the California Statute’s 
Protection of Statements Relating to a “Public Issue” or an “Issue 
of Public Interest” 
One difference between the statutes might be the most important in 
determining the breadth of the Act’s scope. Instead of applying 
protection to certain activities in connection with “an issue of public 
interest,”163 as California does, the Washington Act applies to the same 
activities in connection with “an issue of public concern.”164 
                                                     
160. Id. at *4.  
161. Id. at *6 (citing Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 215–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008), which held that a city newspaper is a public forum under California anti-SLAPP statute). The 
Castello court found “no meaningful distinction” between a newspaper and a local news broadcast 
for the purpose of the statute. 2010 WL 4857022 at *6.  
162. Id. at *6. The court concluded that “the emotional and psychological stability of an 
emergency medical worker is ‘an issue of public concern.’” Id. The court, like the Aronson court, 
declined to interpret the Washington State Legislature’s intent in applying the Washington Act to 
statements related to issues “of public concern.” See infra Part V.B (discussing the Washington 
Act’s application to statements related to issues of public concern).  
163. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).  
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011) (emphasis added).  
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1. California Courts Emphasize Whether an Issue Has Received 
Widespread Attention in Determining What Constitutes an “Issue 
of Public Interest” 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute protects lawful speech “in connection 
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”165 This phrase, in 
conjunction with the legislature’s request that courts construe the statute 
broadly,166 has extended the anti-SLAPP statute to provide protection for 
the producers of the “raunchy, satirical comedy” Borat,167 for a tabloid 
magazine’s stories concerning the sex life of pop singer Britney 
Spears,168 for a website discussing the movie My Big Fat Greek 
Wedding,169 and for unlicensed representations of famous heiress Paris 
Hilton.170 Two prominent tests have emerged from California appellate 
courts to determine which issues are “public” or “of public interest”: the 
Rivero and Weinberg tests.171 
Under the test established in Rivero v. American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees,172 courts discern whether an issue 
falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) statements that “concerned 
a person or entity in the public eye”; (2) “conduct that could directly 
affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”; or (3) a 
“topic of widespread, public interest.”173 
Courts that apply the test formulated in Weinberg v. Feisel,174 decided 
                                                     
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3)–(4). Although the California State Legislature, unlike 
Washington, did not specify that the conduct must be lawful, the California courts have held that the 
statute does not apply to illegal conduct. See, e.g., Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
864, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a). 
167. Jonathan Segal, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit for Glorious Entertainment Industry of 
America: Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an Anti-SLAPP Fence Around the First 
Amendment, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 653–54 (2009). The defendant production 
company successfully argued that several of the issues the movie invoked, particularly in the 
contested scene involving several fraternity brothers, were of public interest, including issues 
surrounding sexism, racism and homophobia. Id. at 654.  
168. London Wright Pegs, Comment, The Media SLAPP Back: An Analysis of California’s Anti-
SLAPP Statute and the Media Defendant, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (2009).  
169. See Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 54–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
170. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010).  
171. Id. at 906–08.  
172. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
173. Id. at 89. Another court, in following this approach, found Rivero to be the first case to deal 
with the public-issue question systematically. Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exch., 
1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
174. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  
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in the same year as Rivero, analyze five principles to establish a 
“somewhat more restrictive test, designed to distinguish between issues 
of ‘public, rather than merely private, interest’”:175 (1) public interest 
“does not equate with mere curiosity”; (2) an issue of public interest 
should be of concern to a substantial number of people; (3) “there should 
be some degree of closeness” between the acts at issue and the asserted 
interest; (4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be on the public 
interest, not to aid in the speaker’s own private interest; and (5) “[a] 
person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public 
interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.”176 
The two tests have something in common: an apparent desire to reject 
the theory that  parochial disputes become public issues merely because 
larger issues might be in play.177 For example, if a homebuyer sues a 
home seller for misrepresenting square footage of a home, the seller 
cannot assert that his conduct related to a matter of public interest 
merely because most Americans live in, buy, and sell houses.178 
The emphasis the two tests place on the widespread attention an issue 
receives, however, allows a court to make fame a primary factor in an 
anti-SLAPP analysis. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that Paris Hilton’s image constituted an issue of public interest 
under both the Rivero and Weinberg tests.179 
2. Washington Courts Have Historically Interpreted “Issue of Public 
Concern” Under the Connick Test 
Unlike the California statute’s protection for “issues of public 
interest,” the Washington Act protects statements made in connection 
with an “issue of public concern.”180 The Act’s legislative history 
                                                     
175. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906 (quoting Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392). 
176. Weinberg, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392–93.  
177. One court called this theory the “synecdoche theory of public issue.” Commonwealth 
Energy, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 395. In Rivero, for example, the defendant union claimed its publication 
of documents relating to the plaintiff’s supervision of eight employees applied under the statute 
because workers’ criticism of unlawful workplace activity was an issue of public interest. The court 
reasoned that under the union’s interpretation, “discussion of nearly every workplace dispute would 
qualify,” and instead concluded that to constitute an issue of public interest, the activity must meet 
“some threshold level of significance.” Rivero, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 90. 
178. See Consumer Justice Ctr. v. Trimedica Int’l, Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (using a similar hypothetical to explain that specific advertising statements about herbal 
supplement did not fall under the anti-SLAPP statute).  
179. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 907–08. Hallmark ultimately failed on the second prong of anti-SLAPP 
analysis because Hilton showed a probability of prevailing on the claim. Id. at 912.  
180. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 2011) (emphasis added), with 
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reveals nothing to explain this deviation from the California statute.181 
By employing this “public concern” language, however, the Washington 
State Legislature borrowed a phrase commonly used by Washington 
courts. For the past twenty-five years, Washington courts have decided 
whether speech is “of public concern” by adopting the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s test from Connick v. Myers.182 
In Connick, an assistant district attorney, in response to a transfer 
request she opposed, circulated a questionnaire around the district office 
concerning office morale, the transfer policy, the need for a grievance 
committee, and the level of confidence in superiors.183 The district 
attorney learned of the questionnaire and fired her. The issue before the 
Court was whether the plaintiff’s expressive conduct pertained to a 
matter of public concern, and therefore deserved First Amendment 
protection.”184 The Court held that it did not.185 
In making this determination, the Court analyzed three factors: the 
content, the form, and the context of the speech.186 The Court’s analysis 
of these factors has become known as the Connick test, and courts have 
employed the test repeatedly to determine whether speech relates to an 
issue of public concern.187 
None of the three factors is individually dispositive.188 When 
analyzing the content, courts look to see if the expression relates to 
public, rather than private, matters.189 When analyzing the form, courts 
                                                     
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
181. See supra Part III.  
182. See Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 138 Wash. 2d 506, 529, 980 P.2d 742, 754 (1999) 
(Johnson, J., concurring); White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997) 
(holding that “[c]ontent is the most important factor”); Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wash. 2d 847, 
851, 719 P.2d 98, 101 (1986).  
183. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1983). 
184. Id. at 142. The Court held that the State “cannot condition public employment on a basis that 
infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.” Id. 
185. Id. at 154. 
186. Id. at 147–48. The Court reviewed a long line of cases in which the Court safeguarded 
speech on issues of public concern and gave lower courts this rough test. Id. at 143–46. The review 
included a famous Massachusetts case in which Oliver Wendell Holmes, before he was named to 
the Court, stated, “[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 
(Mass. 1892). One commentator has called the test “strikingly vacuous.” Cynthia Estlund, Speech 
on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (1990).  
187. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–17 (2011); Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–87 (1987). 
188. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216. 
189. Id. at 1211. 
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consider whether the actor made the expression public, or if the speech 
was made in a private manner, such as a note to a superior.190 And when 
analyzing the context, courts often look to the purpose of the speech, 
particularly whether the speech was part of a public discussion or 
whether it merely served a private purpose.191 In Connick, for example, 
the Court held that the fired employee’s expressive conduct was not 
meant to begin a debate about work conditions, but simply to “gather 
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors.”192 
Thus, it did not address an issue of public concern.193 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently revisited the Connick test in Snyder 
v. Phelps.194 The plaintiff’s son in Snyder, a U.S. Marine, died in Iraq in 
the line of duty.195 On a public street outside the military funeral, a 
Baptist church group held a protest in which it suggested that military 
deaths result from the United States’ tolerance of homosexuals. The 
group held signs inscribed with harshly worded condemnations of 
homosexuality and phrases such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and 
“You’re Going to Hell.”196 
The father, who later saw the signs on television, filed five tort claims 
and won a jury award on three.197 The church group argued that because 
their activities constituted expression on an issue of public concern, the 
trial court should have shielded them from tort liability.198 The Court, 
after applying the Connick test, agreed. Under the first factor, the Court 
found that the content of the defendants’ signs related to broad interests 
                                                     
190. See Markos v. City of Atlanta, 364 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that comments 
made to a newspaper reporter, where it was understood that the statements would be used in a 
published article, were public in nature). But cf. Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 
1362–63 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that speech in a personal notebook where the writer made no 
effort to communicate the contents to the public was private in nature).  
191. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386. In Rankin, the Court found that when a nineteen-year-old 
stated, on the day of an assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan, “if they go for him 
again, I hope they get him,” she spoke on an issue of public concern. Id. at 381, 386. The Court 
found that the context revealed that statement came in the course of a political conversation, on the 
heels of an event that was “certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life 
of the President.” Id. at 386. 
192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.  
193. Id.  
194. 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
195. Id. at 1213. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 1214. The plaintiff’s claims for defamation and publicity given to private life were 
dismissed on summary judgment, but he prevailed on his intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims. Id. 
198. Id.  
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of society—such as the moral conduct of Americans, the country’s fate, 
and homosexuality in the military—that were of public, not private, 
import.199 Although the Court did not discuss the form of the speech, it 
found that the context of the protest reflected the church’s broader 
attempt to condemn society, and not solely the plaintiff’s son.200 
B. The Washington Act Does Not Include California’s Public Interest 
and Commercial Speech Exceptions 
In 2003, the California State Legislature noticed a “disturbing” trend: 
the abuse of anti-SLAPP motions by corporations, a primary target of 
anti-SLAPP legislation.201 Because of the broad construction of the 
statute, corporations began using anti-SLAPP motions to increase the 
time and expense of plaintiff lawsuits.202 Legal seminars promoted the 
use of anti-SLAPP motions in otherwise ordinary products liability and 
personal injury cases.203 With this expanded corporate use, the anti-
SLAPP motion became its own form of legal intimidation.204 As one 
dissenting justice on the California Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he cure has 
become the disease.”205 
The California State Legislature responded to these abuses by 
creating two exceptions to the anti-SLAPP statute. The first exception 
prohibits the use of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike public interest 
lawsuits.206 The second prohibits anti-SLAPP motions by most corporate 
defendants.207 Under the corporate defendant exception, the California 
                                                     
199. Id. at 1216–17. The Court found that even those signs that appeared directly targeted at the 
plaintiff’s son, such as “You’re Going to Hell,” spoke to broader public issues. Id. at 1217.  
200. Id. at 1217. The court did not discuss the form of the speech, although this is likely because 
the form of the speech—picket signs—was unquestionably public. 
201. Joshua L. Baker, Chapter 338: Another Law, Another SLAPP in the Face of California 
Business, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409, 431 (2004). 
202. Id. at 414. 
203. Id. at 413–14.  
204. See id., supra note 201, at 419; Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 714 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., 
dissenting).  
205. Navallier, 52 P.3d at 714 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
206. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.17(b) (West Supp. 2011). For the purposes of the exception, 
“public interest” does not apply anywhere near as broadly as it does in section 425.16. Club 
Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Cal. 2008). Courts have 
found that neither a lawsuit requesting changes to the election process of the Sierra Club nor an 
action by city council members to compel council meetings to adjourn by 11 p.m. constituted 
lawsuits brought solely for the public interest. See id. at 1099–100; Holbrook v. City of Santa 
Monica, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 186–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
207. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(c). 
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law now prohibits anti-SLAPP motions when three conditions exist: (1) 
the target of the suit is “a person primarily engaged in the business of 
selling or leasing goods or services”; (2) the content of the speech 
targeted consists of representations or facts about the speaker’s or a 
competitor’s business goods or services; and (3) the audience of the 
targeted speech is an actual or potential customer or someone likely to 
repeat the speech to an actual or potential customer, or the speech arose 
out of a regulatory proceeding or investigation.208 In order to comply 
with the anti-SLAPP statute’s broad construction, courts interpret the 
exceptions narrowly.209 
When it drafted the Act, the Washington State Legislature did not add 
either exception. 
C. The Washington Act Punishes SLAPP Filers More Severely than 
California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
The California anti-SLAPP statute limits the sanction for filing a 
SLAPP or frivolous anti-SLAPP motion to attorney’s fees. In 
Washington, the Act’s drafters notably increased the amount. The 
Washington Act gives SLAPP victims attorney’s fees plus a $10,000 
award.210 It also grants the trial judges discretion to award “[s]uch 
additional relief . . . as the court determines to be necessary to deter 
repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated.”211 With this provision, the Washington Act gives trial judges 
more flexibility to promote the legislature’s goal of deterring SLAPPs. 
                                                     
208. Id.; see Baker, supra note 201, at 418. All three conditions must exist. See Contemporary 
Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 443–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
209. See Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1098 (Cal. 2008). 
The exceptions also have exceptions. Neither the public interest nor commercial speech exceptions 
apply against three classes of cases: (1) actions against persons engaged in gathering, receiving or 
processing information for communication to the public; (2) actions based upon the promotion of 
any dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic work; (3) actions against nonprofit organizations 
that receive more than 50 percent of their annual revenue from government. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 425.17(d) (West Supp. 2011).  
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(6)(a) (2011). 
211. Id. Although the original bill initially only awarded costs and fees to victims of frivolous 
anti-SLAPP motions, the Senate Judiciary Committee revised the Washington Act so that those 
victims receive a $10,000 award, and the trial judge may award further relief to deter repeated 
frivolous motion practice. 
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V. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD USE THE CALIFORNIA 
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE TO DETERMINE THE LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT BEHIND THE WASHINGTON ACT 
Despite sparse legislative history behind the Washington Act, courts 
have accepted that the drafters of the Washington Act modeled it after 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute.212 One court interpreting the 
Washington Act proclaimed it to be a mirror of the California law, given 
the striking similarities between the two.213 But to interpret the 
Washington Act as a carbon copy of the California law would ignore 
critical differences in their respective texts, most of which have been 
present since the Washington Act was first introduced in the Washington 
State Legislature. Instead, Washington courts should use long-standing 
canons of statutory construction to analyze the Act’s similarities and 
differences with the California law. This careful interpretation will 
reveal a specific legislative intent to adopt some California provisions 
and corresponding case law while rejecting others entirely. The final 
result should be a close following of the California law with an 
important deviation for Washington’s definition of “issues of public 
concern.” This result is consistent with the legislative text and 
Washington’s traditional use of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Connick test. 
A. Interpreting Intent from the Act’s Similarities to, and Its Deviations 
from, the California Anti-SLAPP Statute Is Consistent with Canons 
of Statutory Interpretation 
When the legislature enacts a statute, it does so to accomplish a 
specific purpose, and the goal for the courts in interpreting the statute is 
to divine that purpose.214 Yet the legislative process often hides that 
purpose behind a veil of formality, leaving the courts little guidance to 
implement that purpose properly.215 To carry out a statute’s purpose 
effectively, Washington courts have established several canons of 
                                                     
212. See Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (2010); Castello v. 
City of Seattle, No. C10-1457(MJP), 2010 WL 4857022, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010) 
(relying on California case law interpreting the California Anti-SLAPP statute to determine that the 
statements at issue would fall under the protection of the Washington Anti-SLAPP Act). 
213. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.  
214. See Quadrant Homes v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash. 2d 224, 244, 110 
P.3d 1132, 1142 (2005) (“The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern the legislature’s 
intent.”). 
215. Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV 
179, 179 (2001).  
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statutory interpretation.216 
One particular external canon that should aid courts in implementing 
the purpose of the Washington Act is the borrowed statute rule. Under 
the borrowed statute rule, courts find that when the legislature borrows a 
statute from another jurisdiction, it implicitly adopts that jurisdiction’s 
judicial interpretations of the statute.217 Similarly, where the legislature 
modifies or ignores a provision of the borrowed statute, it implicitly 
rejects that provision and its corresponding case law.218 The borrowed 
statute rule often involves interpretation of statutes that derive from a 
model act.219 The Washington State Supreme Court has found that when 
the legislature deviates from a model act, it is “bound to conclude” that 
the deviation “was purposeful” and evidenced an intent to reject those 
aspects of the model act.220 
Because the California anti-SLAPP statute served as a model for the 
Washington Act, courts can use the borrowed statute rule to interpret the 
Washington Act. Where the Washington State Legislature adopted the 
California statute’s provisions, the Washington Act reveals an explicit 
intent to embrace the interpretation of those provisions. For example, 
courts should find that the Washington State Legislature intended to 
adopt the California courts’ interpretation of “public forum” for the 
statute’s purposes, or California’s interpretation of what constitutes 
“good cause” to overcome the stay of discovery. Courts should also 
interpret the Act to adopt the provisions of the California statute that 
provide a procedural remedy for defendants to shield themselves from 
SLAPPs,221 that offer an opportunity for plaintiffs to prove their claim 
                                                     
216. Id. at 180. Many of those canons are textual, in that they look solely at the words of the 
statute; others are external, in that they look to outside sources to divine legislative intent. Id. at 
184–85. 
217. Id. at 197; see also Town of Republic v. Brown, 97 Wash. 2d 915, 917–18, 652 P.2d 955, 
957 (1982); Jenkins v. Bellingham Mun. Ct., 95 Wash. 2d 574, 577–78, 627 P.2d 1316, 1318 
(1981); Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pierce Cnty., 27 Wash. 2d 347, 355, 178 P.2d 351, 355 
(1947). This canon, though, would not require the courts to adopt future interpretations of the other 
jurisdiction, as the legislature could not have intended to adopt law it did not know existed.  
218. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Coleman, 115 Wash. App. 172, 177–78, 60 P.3d 595, 599 (2002) 
(“[W]hen the model act in an area of law contains a certain provision, but the Legislature fails to 
adopt such a provision, our courts conclude that the Legislature intended to reject the provision.”). 
219. See State v. Coria, 146 Wash. 2d 631, 650, 48 P.3d 980, 989 (2002) (“[F]ailure to include 
language from the Model Penal Code in a criminal statute evidences an intent that the statute’s 
meaning differs from the Model Penal Code.”); Lundberg, 115 Wash. App. at 177–78, 60 P.3d at 
599 (analyzing deviations from the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act).  
220. State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 723, 976 P.2d, 1229, 1234 (1999) (holding that the 
legislature’s deviation from the model act was evidence of its intent to reject the concept of 
extending accomplice liability for omissions to act). 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93 (explaining the two statutes’ use of a procedural 
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has merit,222 and that direct the courts to apply and construe the 
Washington Act broadly.223 
Where the Washington Act deviates from its model statute, however, 
Washington courts should conclude that the legislature intended to reject 
related provisions and their corresponding case law. This is especially 
true for the Washington State Legislature’s coverage of issues “of public 
concern” as opposed to California’s protection of issues “of public 
interest.” 
B. To Interpret the Act’s Protection of Speech Related to an “Issue of 
Public Concern,” Washington Courts Should Continue to Apply 
the Connick Test 
By applying the statute to statements made in connection with “an 
issue of public concern,” instead of adopting the California statute’s 
“public interest” language, the legislature selected a phrase familiar to 
the Washington courts. Washington courts, for more than twenty years, 
have applied a test to determine what expression relates to issues of 
public concern.224 The test, established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1983 in Connick v. Myers and still applied today, provides a standard for 
courts that would fulfill the Act’s purpose of granting further protection 
to speech that lies at the heart of the freedom of expression. 
The Connick test is well-suited to analyzing Washington anti-SLAPP 
motions for two primary reasons.225 First, it fulfills the goals of the 
Washington Act. The drafters of the Washington Act sought the same 
goal as the U.S. Supreme Court when it formulated the Connick test: to 
provide protection to those who express themselves on issues of public 
concern. Just as the Court has found that public participation is “the 
                                                     
remedy). 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93 (explaining the two statutes’ use of a procedural 
remedy). 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82 (explaining the two statutes’ directives for broad 
construction).  
224. See Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 138 Wash. 2d 506, 529, 980 P.2d 742, 754 (1999) 
(Johnson, J., concurring); White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997) 
(holding that “[c]ontent is the most important factor”); Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wash. 2d 847, 
851, 719 P.2d 98, 101 (1986).  
225. Rhode Island courts, interpreting an anti-SLAPP statute that similarly applies to “issues of 
public concern,” have also used the Connick test. See Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 
A.2d 1208, 1214 (R.I. 2000) (finding Connick test to underlie anti-SLAPP statute’s use of “issues of 
public concern”); Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. NC-2008-0119, 2009 WL 3328540, at *3–5 
(R.I. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2009) (applying Connick test to anti-SLAPP motion).  
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essence of self-government,”226 the Washington State Legislature found, 
when passing the Washington Act, that “[i]t is in the public interest for 
citizens to participate in matters of public concern . . . without fear of 
reprisal through abuse of the judicial process.”227 
Second, it fulfills those goals in a way familiar to Washington 
courts.228  Washington courts already apply the Connick test to interpret 
what speech is “of public concern” in federal employment law cases 
similar to Connick.229 Most notably, the Supreme Court of Washington 
applied the Connick test in Binkley v. City of Tacoma230 and White v. 
State.231 When the legislature employs words or concepts with well-
settled common law traditions, Washington courts presume they should 
follow the common law usage.232 Additionally, Washington courts 
traditionally give the Connick test such a broad reading that “even the 
slightest tinge of public concern is sufficient.”233 The Connick test 
provides Washington courts the most direction for interpreting the 
Washington Act in determining what activities are in connection with an 
issue of public concern. 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation filled a gap in Washington’s protection of free expression 
and petition rights. Although Washington previously only protected 
communication with a government agency, the Washington Act now 
protects a broad range of activities from lawsuits intended only to incur 
costs and chill future expression. The Washington drafters patterned the 
Act after the anti-SLAPP statute in California, the same state whose 
constitutional right of free speech served as the basis for Washington’s 
                                                     
226. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
227. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 921. 
228. This is not to suggest that Washington courts, when applying the Connick test to the anti-
SLAPP statute, should be bound by outcomes reached by the United States Supreme Court and 
others under the test.  
229. See cases cited supra note 224. 
230. 114 Wash. 2d 373, 382, 787 P.2d 1366, 1373–74 (1990).  
231. 131 Wash. 2d 1, 11–12, 929 P.2d 396, 403–04 (1997).  
232. Talmadge, supra note 215, at 198; see In re Tyler’s Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 689, 250 P. 456, 
460 (1926) (holding that in the absence of a statutory exception prohibiting a husband from 
inheriting when he murdered his wife, the “maxims of the common law,” forbidding profit by fraud, 
controlled). 
233. White, 131 Wash. 2d at 12 n.5, 929 P.2d at 404 n.5 (quoting Binkley, 114 Wash. 2d at 383 
n.8, 787 P.2d at 1373 n.8). 
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constitutional right. Despite little legislative history to provide courts 
guidance on why Washington chose to modify or ignore certain 
provisions, the choices themselves reveal a legislative intent to reject 
California’s interpretation of those provisions. One of the primary 
inquiries for courts, then, will be interpreting which exercises of free 
expression meet the statutory requirement of connecting to an issue of 
public concern. But Washington courts need not strain far in that inquiry 
because the test most suitable to fulfill the Act’s goals, the Connick test, 
already possesses a firm place in Washington jurisprudence. 
 
